The Concept of Protecting the Region in This War

Dr Adalat Abdullah

Written by Dr Adalat Abdullah, Researcher, Academic Centre for National Studies (ACNS).
Translated by Narmeen Othman Mohammad

The U.S./Israel–Iran war, after more than a month, has entered a more intense and heated phase. Any change that emerges in wars of this kind inevitably reshapes the associated ideas, beliefs, and concepts. They will not remain as they were.
We have all received the message that the Kurdistan Region, from the very beginning, has declared to the domestic public, the region, and the wider world that it will remain neutral, adopting a strategy of self-preservation aimed at keeping its land, institutions, and public welfare away from the flames of war.
In principle, this position is objective and rational in relation to the war and its parties. However, in practice, it has not succeeded in preventing missile and drone attacks.
The question is: why? Before this war, or during its course, what policies or positions existed that may now be used to justify such attacks? Are these attacks limited only to certain points within the Region that are suspected of serving one of the warring sides, or have they expanded to include other targets as well?
These questions are important so that, in shaping our understanding of how to protect the Region, we wouldn't fall into the trap of impulsive reactions—even if such reactions appear in the form of statements of condemnation. This is especially crucial because anyone familiar with the conventional strategies of parties involved in wars—not only this war—understands that they often aim, simultaneously, to identify both friends and enemies, to extract positions from others, and sometimes even to defer such positioning until after the war.
From this perspective, the question “What have we done to deserve being attacked?” is not solely related to our wartime stance or reactions. Rather, war itself becomes a pretext for reopening old files and revisiting past records, in order to test the sincerity or inconsistency of positions taken before the conflict.
This dimension of war, in general, is also present in this particular conflict. If the losses and gains of wars often serve as major factors in reshaping political alignments, then this war is no exception.
The Kurds in the Kurdistan Region, in this regard, need a positive reading of the positions of regional countries—those outside the direct circle of the war, such as Arab Gulf states, Türkiye, and many others—namely, a policy of “avoiding entanglement.” For the Kurdistan Region, this means neither being forced to strictly adhere to Iraq’s official policy, which largely seeks to distance itself entirely from the war, nor adopting a stance based purely on the Kurdish national cause.
From this angle, one may ask: what have the 22 Arab states done for Gaza? If the Kurdistan Region wishes to remain protected, it should act within similar limits regarding national causes. Wars of this harsh nature clearly transform the very concepts of political positioning. Today, national interest does not lie in being drawn into a war based on misguided calculations—one that, instead of realising national aspirations, could expose even the currently secure part of Kurdistan to risk and devastation, potentially reducing it to the fate of Gaza.
Political wisdom lies in the ability to determine those moments when, before pursuing any political dream, it becomes essential to safeguard what already exists. Ideological thinking should not deceive us or drag us into political or security adventures that might cost us what we have already achieved.
It is true that the Kurds in the Kurdistan Region, historically, have sought to maintain friendly relations with both the Americans and the Iranians. However, since the project of protecting the Region after the 1991 uprising has largely been a western-backed project, a degree of suspicion has always remained. At that time, instead of hostility, Iran chose to establish friendly relations with Iraqi Kurds and their experience. This policy proved more beneficial during the fall of the Ba’ath regime and the subsequent return to the Region. Since then, Iran’s primary demand has been that the Region’s territory not be used against it.
To some extent, the Region has adhered to this, yet the occurrence of missile and drone attacks in this war is linked to the logic of hard power and the necessities of warfare itself.
The Region’s losses—around 5%—are not comparable to the devastation suffered by Gulf countries in this destructive war. Nevertheless, those states, possessing strong governments and powerful armies, avoid entering wars that would increase their losses.
The Region, therefore, must take a deep breath and remain composed, adopting a policy of restraint rather than emotional political reactions. It should utilise both covert and overt diplomatic channels to reduce threats and minimise losses—especially at this stage, when both the war and rumours of negotiations and efforts to halt it are intensifying.